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Carolyn Fischer 
Abstract 
Some environmental policies focus on emissions intensity rather than total emissions, or they try 
to mitigate the regulatory impact on the final product market. To analyze the effects of these policies, or 
to evaluate the distributional effects of any regulation on consumers and producers, output must be 
incorporated explicitly into an economic model of abatement, separately from the emissions variable. 
This provides two options. Traditionally, total emissions and output are the independently controlled 
variables, leaving emissions intensity as endogenously determined. Alternatively, one can make emissions 
intensity and output the control variables, leaving total emissions as the endogenously determined 
variable. One is the dual of the other and the problems are equivalent, but the latter method offers more 
transparency for examining intensity-based policies. This note shows how the intensity-based model fits 
into the traditional context. 
Key Words:  emissions intensity, emissions standards, environmental tax, pollution, tradable 
emissions permits  
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Introduction 
In typical models of emissions taxes or tradable permit policies, economists focus on the 
emissions side of the market—the costs and benefits of abatement—while the final product 
market remains in the background. On the other hand, for some emissions control policies, one 
of the regulatory goals is explicitly to mitigate price impacts in the product market—not just to 
affect the emissions market. Primary examples are intensity-based policies, like tradable 
performance standards or emissions price policies that incorporate output-based refunding. These 
range from U.S. EPA’s lead phasedown program, to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
standards, to the Swedish NOx tax-rebate plan, to proposals to allocate tradable emissions 
permits according to output shares within an industry.1
To analyze the effects of these kinds of policies, or to evaluate the distributional effects 
of any regulation on consumers and producers, one must incorporate output explicitly into the 
economic model, separately from the emissions variable. Then, two options are available. One 
option is to choose total emissions and output as independently controlled variables, leaving 
emissions intensity as endogenously determined.2 Alternatively, one can make emissions 
intensity and output the control variables, leaving total emissions as the endogenously 
determined variable.3 One is the dual of the other and the problems are equivalent. I often choose 
the latter method in my work as a bit more transparent method for examining intensity-based 
policies. However, since this choice of focusing on emissions intensity is less common, I present 
this note to show how it fits into the traditional context. 
                                                 
∗ Fischer is a Fellow at Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. She may be reached at fischer@rff.org. 
1 These kinds of rate-based allocations more generally are part of the U.S. NOx trading program under development 
for the Northeastern states and a likely part of national allocation plans for CO2 in the European Union. 
2 For examples in the rebating literature, see Sterner and Isaakson (forthcoming), Gersbach and Requate (2004) or 
Bernard et al. (2005).  
3 For example, see Fischer (2003), as well as Quirion (2003). Millock and Nauges (2006) use input efficiency as a 
choice parameter. 
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Modeling Choices 
Let us consider the problem of a representative competitive firm facing an emissions 
price (or tax) and receiving a permit allocation (or tax refund) according to its output. Let P be 
the output price, q be the output quantity, e be emissions, t be the price of emissions, and a be the 
per-unit allocation, which is also valued at t. Emissions intensity is then the ratio of total 
emissions per unit of output: / eq µ = . The firm’s production costs are some function  (,) Cq µ  
that is increasing and weakly convex in output and declining and convex in emissions intensity. 
Furthermore, targeting a higher emissions rate lowers the cost of additional output.  
Emissions Framework 
Let us examine the problem for firm i in the framework with total emissions and output 
as the control variables, with intensity endogenous. In this case, we write the profit function as 
 
  (, ) ii i i i Pq C e q te taqi π = −− +  (1) 












or that the marginal cost of reducing emissions must just balance the emissions price. 













In other words, the equilibrium price will equal the marginal cost of production, given the 
level of emissions, plus the value of the emissions allocation. Note that with emissions as an 
independently controlled variable, output only affects the refund on the margin, not the 
emissions payment. 
Now, let us use emissions intensity and output as the control variables, with total 
emissions being endogenous. Then, the problem of our representative firm is 
 
  (, ) ii i i ii i Pq C q q t q taqi π µµ =− − + (4) 
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which yields the same result as (2). Maximizing now with respect to output, we get 
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However, using (5), this condition simplifies to the same result as (3). 
Implicit, but not explicit, in this analysis is that increasing output raises emissions. 










> . Furthermore, the tax costs of 
those additional emissions are implicitly in the production costs. However, recognizing that one 
way to reduce total emissions is to conserve output is often easier to see in a model of emissions 
intensity, in which this tradeoff is explicit.  
Intensity Framework 
In this explicit intensity framework, we designate production costs as a function of 
emissions intensity and output, although these costs could still represent the same underlying 
function as before. With  ( , ) ii Cq µ , we similarly assume that costs are increasing and weakly 
convex in output and declining and convex in emissions intensity, and that targeting a higher 
emissions rate lowers the cost of additional output.  
Now, the problem becomes 
 
  (,) ii i ii Pq C q t taqi π µµ = −− +  (7) 
















or that the per-unit cost of reducing emissions intensity must equal the emissions price. We write 
the condition in this manner to show the result is the same as before, since 
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In other words, the firm will produce until the market price reflects the sum of the marginal cost 
of output and the cost of the emissions embodied in that output, net of the value of the additional 
allocation. Again, in the same manner as before, if we set up the problem as 
(/,) ii i i i i Pq C e q q te taqi π =− − + and maximized with respect to total emissions and output, we 
would end up with the same first-order conditions as with emissions intensity. 
The key difference between (9) and (3) is that the cost function is holding emissions 
intensity, rather than total emissions, constant when we evaluate the cost of an additional unit of 
output. In other words, the answers differ because we are asking different questions. In (3) we 
ask, what does the next unit of output cost if we adjust our behavior to keep our emissions 
constant? In (9) we ask, what does the next unit of output cost if our behavior keeps our 
emissions rate constant? 
This is a subtle but important difference. In terms of the optimal allocation of emissions 
and output, the choice of framework doesn’t matter. However, the latter formulation seems more 
intuitive for evaluating the interaction between emissions markets and output markets. When we 
think about how firms approach emissions reductions, we focus on technologies and changes to 
production practices that reduce emissions, given any level of output—that is, that reduce 
emissions intensity. We also recognize that if we continue with the current business as usual, 
increasing output tends to increase emissions. The flip side of that coin is that another option for 
reducing emissions is conservation—that is, producing less. These tradeoffs are all readily 
apparent when the modeling framework focuses on emissions intensity. 
Abatement Cost Framework 
Policymakers have a penchant for tracking emissions intensity, since they are focused on 
product markets. An oft-stated goal is restraining emissions without sacrificing growth. Most 
traditional command-and-control regulations limit emissions rates, not total emissions. Now, 
market-based programs are also being given a rate-based focus. An important part of the 
reasoning behind programs that allocate emissions permits or refund emissions tax revenues 
according to output is to mitigate the impact of a regulation on prices and production. 
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Environmental economists, on the other hand, tend to focus on emissions markets. Output 
consequences stay in the background, and lost surplus from higher costs and lower output merely 
forms part of the abatement costs. Fortunately, we can easily map this output-oriented 
framework back into the traditional framework of abatement costs. 
Let   be the abatement cost function, where  ( ) FA 00 Aqq µ µ = − . First, let us identify 
baseline emissions and output as the values of  0 µ  and   that jointly solve  0 q 00 (,)0 Cq µ µ −=  and 
00 () (,) q Pq C q 0 µ = , since our representative firm represents total industry output, which must in 
equilibrium equal demand. 
Next, for this partial equilibrium model, total surplus is the area under the demand curve 
net of production costs: 
   (10) 
0
(,) ( ) (,)
q
Sq P s d s Cq µ =− ∫ µ
The abatement cost curve then is the surplus foregone—the increase in production costs 
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These costs depend on the choice of µ  and q, not on redistributive measures like the tax 
revenues or payments by consumers to producers. However, the combination of µ  and q chosen 
by the firm does depend on the combination of tax and allocation rates. Thus, if we are 
evaluating policies that do more than set an emissions price or abatement target, we cannot think 
of a single abatement supply curve, since it will shift with the output allocation incentives.  
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In a decentralized framework, µ  and q must jointly satisfy  ( , ) Cq µ t µ − =  and 
() (,) ( ) q Pq C q t a µ µ =+ − . By definition, dA qd dq µ µ = −−, so  . 
Substituting and simplifying, we can express total marginal abatement costs as a function of the 
marginal unit costs of reducing emissions intensity and the effect of the industry’s output 
response on its allocation: 
() /1 / dd A d q d A µµ =− + / q













                                                
 (13) 
Thus, in the absence of any output-based allocation (a = 0), we see that total marginal 
abatement costs equal the marginal unit costs of reducing emissions intensity, which in turn 
equals the emissions price. Positive output incentives, however, increase the overall marginal 
abatement costs—since less conservation is being made, more effort has to be put into reducing 
emissions intensity. A caveat for this result is the partial equilibrium framework, as the welfare 
costs in a general equilibrium framework are more complex than the partial costs if there are 
other market imperfections present.  
Conclusion 
Ultimately, choosing whether to model environmental policy effects using emissions or 
intensity is a matter of taste and convenience. This choice does not affect the absolute results 
with respect to the economic tradeoffs. It can, however, affect the relative emphasis in the 
interpretation of those results. In particular, the tradeoffs between conservation and changing 
production techniques can be more transparent with intensity choice models. 
The key difference is in the modeling of costs. In the first method, we evaluate the cost of 
the next unit of output, assuming we adjust our behavior to keep our emissions constant. In the 
second method, we evaluate the cost of the next unit of output assuming our behavior keeps our 
emissions rate constant. 
When simplified forms of production costs are useful, intensity is often a more logical 
choice. For example, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of the economy often 
assume constant returns to scale in production. Emissions reductions then come from the 
production factor mix (effectively determining intensity) and the contraction of the industry.4 
One can then assume that the chosen emissions intensity determines the level of the constant 
marginal production costs. These kinds of simplifications are suitable for pollution reductions 
made through changes to input uses (like fuel switching), production methods, or end-of-pipe 
technologies that scrub a certain percentage of emissions. However, they are less able to take 
into account technologies that remove absolute quantities of emissions. Therefore, the available 
 
4 See Dissou (2005).  
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abatement options need to factor into the choice of simplified forms of production costs that are 
inclusive of abatement. 
Although this note demonstrates examples in a partial equilibrium model, the duality 
concept applies equally to general equilibrium models with multiple sectors.5 This lesson is 
simply that if the underlying functions are the same, and the regulatory policies are the same, the 
markets (and the economists) will arrive at the same point, whether they get there focusing on 
reducing emissions intensity or total emissions. 
                                                 
5 In CGE models comparing emissions permit allocation systems, Dissou (2005) uses emissions factors for 
production inputs while Boehringer and Lange (2005) use total emissions as the control variable. 
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